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INTERIM PAYMENTS AND ECONOMIC 
DAMAGES TO COMPENSATE PRIVATE-
PARTY VICTIMS OF HAZARDOUS 
RELEASES 
JULIE E. STEINER* 
There is a gap in tort recovery for many hazardous release victims.  
Hazardous spill victims receive different damage compensation based 
solely upon the type of hazardous substance released, with oil spill victims 
benefitting from a number of statutory damage recovery mechanisms that 
victims of other type of hazardous substance releases do not receive.  
Specifically, those injured by oil spills receive interim payments and 
recover for their economic loss.  Yet, many victims injured by non-oil 
hazardous spills will incur economic harm but will not receive 
compensation because of a prohibition on recovery for economic loss 
absent accompanying physical injury or private property damage.  That 
prohibition on recovery, known as the “pure economic loss rule,” serves 
as an effective bar to recovery for most spill victims because hazardous 
releases often damage public natural resources (such as water) rather than 
private property.  This Article articulates normative policy for expanding 
interim payments and pure economic loss recovery to a larger class of 
private-party hazardous release than just those injured by oil. 
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Spills are excellent engines of pure economic loss.  They cause 
relatively little damage to private property or human life.  Instead, 
they devastate something un-owned—natural resources, wildlife, 
the shores, the environment—and that devastation causes severe 
disruption to the surrounding co-dependent economy.  The 
resulting loss to individuals and businesses is a massive economic 
ricochet.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many victims injured by hazardous releases2 will not be 
compensated because of a prohibition on recovering economic loss 
absent accompanying physical injury or property damage.3  This 
exclusion, known as the “pure economic loss rule,” is broadly applied in 
federal maritime and state common law to prohibit recovery for “pure” 
economic harm.4  For example, under this rule, if a fishing charterer’s 
 
1.  Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Great Spill in the Gulf . . . and a Sea of Pure Economic 
Loss: Reflections on the Boundaries of Civil Liability, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 105, 109 (2011) 
(italics added) (discussing oil spills). 
2.  For this Article’s general purpose, a “hazardous” substance broadly references toxic 
substances, including oil and natural gas.  A “release” references any spilling, leaking, 
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or 
disposing into the environment. 
3.  “Economic loss” is calculable pecuniary loss that can be substantiated by evidence.  It 
includes lost income or profit, lost earnings capacity, property damage, and personal injury.  
It is distinct from non-economic harm like pain and suffering, loss of life’s enjoyment, and 
punitive damages.  See Karen Beth Clark, Comment, Recovery of Economic Losses Under the 
Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention and Response Act:  Chapter 
21E, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 511, 511–12 (1994). 
4.  See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 1, at 115.  This exclusionary rule is known by a variety of 
terms, including the rule in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927), the 
exclusionary loss rule, the relational economic loss rule, the stand-alone economic loss rule, 
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boat engine is fouled by a chemical spill and the charterer cannot fish, 
the charterer can recover the property damage along with consequential 
economic loss like business interruption.  However, if a chemical spill 
fouls the water and not the boat, and the charterer cannot fish because 
of a ban on fishing or a decline in the fish population, the charterer’s 
loss is “purely” economic, and there is no recovery for the charterer’s 
business interruption.  In both instances, the charterer has lost income 
because of a hazardous release.  It is only when the loss is a consequence 
of property damage or physical injury that the loss is recoverable.5  
Courts and commentators articulate numerous and varied justifications 
for the rule, including its bright-line simplicity, the fact that it limits what 
would otherwise be open-ended liability, its ability to avert fraudulent 
claims, and the fact that it maintains liability in scale with the gravity of 
the defendant’s conduct.6   
The pure economic loss rule operates as a complete bar to recovery 
for many release victims.7  Hazardous spills often do not cause physical 
harm or private property damage because the injury occurs instead to 
publicly owned resources like water bodies, air, wildlife, and other 
natural resources.8  When the injury is to a public resource, the pure 
economic loss rule operates to bar victim recovery.9  The plight of 
release victims is compounded because, even when economic loss is 
legally recoverable as a consequence of physical injury or property 
 
and the general economic loss no liability doctrine.  Commentators are divided on whether it 
is truly a single rule, a series of rules, or a legal policy against pure economic loss recovery.  
Id. at 115, 119. 
5.  Andrew B. Davis, Note, Pure Economic Loss Claims Under the Oil Pollution Act:  
Combining Policy and Congressional Intent, 45 COLUM. J.L & SOC. PROBS. 1, 5 (2011).  
6.  See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 1, at 109–10, 115, 118 & n.59.  While this Article does not 
attempt to provide a comprehensive compilation of the justifications for the pure economic 
loss rule, a particularly thoughtful review can be found at Anita Bernstein, Keep it Simple: An 
Explanation of the Rule of No Recovery for Pure Economic Loss, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 773 
(2006). 
7.  Ronen Perry, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and the Limits of Civil Liability, 86 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 10 (2011) (listing all those who are affected by oil spills and then noting 
that “American courts have consistently denied recovery for this kind of loss”). 
8.  See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 1, at 109 (identifying the fact that oil spills often damage 
un-owned public resources and thus the economic loss rule effectively shields polluters from 
oil spill liability); Perry, supra note 7, at 10.  
9.  Palmer, supra note 1, at 116 (discussing how oil spills have a limited impact on private 
property). 
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damage, victims face a problematic time lag between injury and claims 
payment.10  
Three notable exceptions exist that enable hazardous release victims 
to recover certain types of pure economic loss.  The first is a general 
exception for commercial fisherman that developed in admiralty and 
common law.11  The second is an exception in some jurisdictions for 
family members.12  The third exception is for oil release victims.13 
The disparity in compensation for victims of oil and non-oil 
hazardous substance releases is illustrated by comparing outcomes in 
the following two scenarios.  In January 2014, a West Virginia coal 
company’s 48,000-gallon storage tank ruptured, leaking approximately 
10,000 gallons of the coal wash 4-Methylcyclohexane methanol and 
propylene glycol phenyl ether into the nearby Elk River, ultimately 
contaminating the public water supply.14  Administrators quickly 
declared a state of emergency, and over 300,000 residents were banned 
from using water for all purposes except to flush toilets or for fire-
fighting purposes.15  The injury was immediate.16  Among many 
 
10.  Delayed compensation is not particular to hazardous release victims.  Hazardous 
spills, however, have long been the subject of particular public legislative focus.  As discussed 
in Part II, there are policy reasons to expedite compensation for victims of hazardous 
releases.  While this Article’s focus is on hazardous substance releases, it is certainly possible 
that many of the policy arguments about interim damages might inform a discussion about 
expedited claims processing in other contexts. 
11.  See infra Part II.A. 
12.  See infra Part II.A. 
13.  See infra Part II.A. 
14.  See, e.g., Coral Davenport & Ashley Southall, Critics Say Chemical Spill Highlights 
Lax West Virginia Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2014, at A8 (describing release of 4-
methylcyclohexane methanol from Freedom River Industries, Inc.’s, Elk River storage 
facility); Ashley Southall, Chemical Spill Fouls Water in West Virginia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 
2014, at A14.  On January 17, 2014, eight days after the leak, the company filed for 
bankruptcy.  See, e.g., Tom Hals, Company in West Virginia Chemical Spill Files for 
Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Jan. 17, 2014, 5:38 PM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/20
14/01/17/freedomindustries-bankrutpcy-idUSL2N0KR1OA20140117, archived at http://perma
.cc/DQX4-3825. 
15.  W. VA. BUREAU FOR PUB. HEALTH & THE AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
DISEASE REGISTRY, ELK RIVER CHEMICAL SPILL HEALTH EFFECTS: FINDINGS OF 
EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT RECORD REVIEW (2014), available at http://www.dhhr.wv.gov/N
ews/chemical-spill/Documents/ElkRiverMedicalRecordSummary.pdf,  archived at http://perm
a.cc/CX27-TJM9; Trip Gabriel, Thousands Without Water After Spill in West Virginia, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2014, at A9.  A “do not use” order for the public water supply went into effect 
on January 9, 2014, and was gradually lifted beginning on January 13, 2014.  Michael Wines, 
Chemical Company Owners Are Charged in Spill that Tainted West Virginia Water, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2014, at A25; see also Davenport & Southall, supra note 14, at A8. 
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categories of injury, businesses and schools had to shut their doors.17  
Some victims suffered health effects.18  Residents had to arrange for 
alternative water.19  One early study estimated that the chemical spill 
cost the West Virginia economy $19 million a day for each business day 
the water ban was in effect.20  These are but a few examples of the 
economic loss experienced by the 2014 West Virginia Elk River release 
victims. 
In the second situation, an oil company’s 18,000-foot deep 
exploratory deep oil well located in the Gulf of Mexico ruptured, 
ultimately leading to a three-month long oil leak of approximately 4.9 
million barrels of crude.21  As with the release in West Virginia, the 
economic injury was immediate.  A ban on Gulf fishing affected not 
 
16.  See, e.g., Gabriel, supra note 15. 
17.  Jonathan Matisse, Businesses Incur Losses After Chemical Spill, WASH. TIMES (May 
11, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/may/10/businesses-incur-losses-after-c
hemical-spill/?page=all, archived at http://perma.cc/JZ9L-VN84; Evan Osnos, Chemical 
Valley, NEW YORKER, Apr. 7, 2014, at 38, 41.   
18.  W. VA. BUREAU FOR PUB. HEALTH & THE AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
DISEASE REGISTRY, supra note 15.  Approximately 369 people were treated at emergency 
departments complaining of symptoms relating to exposure to contaminated water.  Id.  Of 
those, 13 were hospitalized and 356 were treated in the emergency room and released.  Id. 
19.  Matisse, supra note 17 (describing business loss, cost of buying alternative water, 
and lack of insurance and public relief); Osnos, supra note 17, at 41 (describing residents 
fighting each other in an attempt to secure waning supplies of water, and efforts to drive 
eighty miles to purchase water). 
20.  See Clark Davis, Businesses Lose $61 Million Because of Elk River Spill, W. VA. 
PUB. BROADCASTING (Feb. 13, 2014), http://wvpublic.org/post/businesses-lose-61-million-
because-elk-river-spill, archived at http://perma.cc/GN8F-7KFV (describing Marshall 
University Center for Business and Economic Research findings estimating that in the four 
business days immediately following the ban—two business days and two weekend days—the 
impact was about $61 million, affecting about 75,000 workers each day, or about 41% of the 
area work force, and lower-wage service-producing workers were more affected than those in 
higher wage industries).   
21.  See MARCIA MCNUTT ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ASSESSMENT OF 
FLOW RATE ESTIMATES FOR THE DEEPWATER HORIZON/MACONDO WELL OIL SPILL 
(2011), available at http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfi
le&PageID=237763; Marcia K. McNutt et al., Review of Flow Rate Estimates of the 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 20260 (2012) (quantifying a 
discharge rate of 50,000–70,000 barrels a day, totaling nearly 5 million barrels of oil released 
from the well between April 20 and July 15, 2010, when the leak was capped).  The oil was 
discharged along with copious amounts of dispersants—about 1.8 million gallons total—in an 
attempt to break up the oil and, theoretically, make it easier for microorganisms to digest.  
See PAUL F. ZUKUNFT, OPERATIONAL SCIENCE ADVISORY TEAM (OSAT) UNIFIED AREA 
COMMAND, SUMMARY REPORT FOR SUB-SEA AND SUB-SURFACE OIL AND DISPERSANT 
DETECTION: SAMPLING AND MONITORING 6 (2010), available at http://www.restorethegulf.g
ov/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/OSAT_Report_FINAL_17DEC.pdf. 
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only commercial fisherman but also individuals who depended upon the 
Gulf resources for both sustenance and livelihood.22  Gulf tourism 
plummeted.23  Many businesses lost earnings, laid workers off, or shut 
their doors entirely.24  The anxiety and stigma associated with the oil 
contamination had ripple effects that arguably led to a decline in 
seafood consumption and a travel aversion to the Gulf region, affecting 
numerous individuals and businesses that persisted even after the 
moratorium ceased.25  Those are just a few examples of the economic 
loss experienced by the 2010 BP Gulf oil spill victims. 
The two scenarios are similar.  In both instances victims lost business 
income, profit, and out-of-pocket expense.  Yet in the Gulf, victims had 
the ability not only to recover compensation for pure economic loss but 
also to recover it rapidly.  In fact, $2.4 billion was paid to 170,000 
individuals and businesses through its interim claims processing within 
three months of the Gulf spill.26  Compare that with the fact that most 
West Virginia victims might not receive any compensation.27  Even 
those who can recover will experience delay before their claims are 
settled or adjudicated.28  In the meantime, they carry the cost of their 
harm. 
This Article endeavors to articulate normative policy for expanding 
interim payments and pure economic damages to a larger class of 
private-party hazardous release victims than commercial fishermen, 
family members, or those injured by oil.  Interim payments refer to pre-
final and partial payments of a claimant’s ultimate damage award. 
 
22.  See Palmer, supra note 1, at 109, 116 n.49 (after $1.5 billion in funds were disbursed 
to claimants in Louisiana, 99% of the claims filed were for economic damage while only 1% 
was for property damage); Davis, supra note 5, at 2.  
23.  Maureen Mackey, BP Oil Spill:  Gulf Tourism Takes a Huge Hit, FISCAL TIMES 
(Jun. 24, 2010), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2010/06/24/BP-Oil-Spill-Gulf-Tourism-
Takes-a-Huge-Hit, archived at http://perma.cc/K667-2UR9. 
24.  Davis, supra note 5, at 2–3. 
25.  Id. at 2. 
26.  KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT: FAIR COMPENSATION AFTER 
TRAGEDY AND FINANCIAL UPHEAVAL 141 (2012).  Compare that with the fact that, at the 
same time, no litigant had received payment in court.  That is not to say that there were not 
issues with the operation of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF); however, under 
extraordinary time and public pressure, the GCCF facilitated large-scale, rapid compensation 
to many victims.  Additional detail about the GCCF interim claims process experience is 
provided in Part IV.B. 
27.  See Hals, supra note 14. 
28.  Five months after the West Virginia spill those victims had not yet received 
compensation.  See Matisse, supra note 17, at 1. 
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Approximately 25,000 to 35,000 chemical incidents occur each year.29  
Releases often damage un-owned public resources.30  Thus, as a 
practical matter many release victims will incur only pure economic 
harm and will be barred from recovery.  The exceptions that exist for 
commercial fisherman, family members, and oil spill victims are unduly 
restrictive and create compensation inequity for otherwise similarly 
situated victims of other types of hazardous spills.31   
Moreover, the delay between the injury and any eventual 
compensation award further harms release victims.32  Delay affects a 
victim’s financial stability, causes stress, and can detour a victim’s funds 
away from supporting sound health and lifestyle choices.  The time lag 
generally favors the polluter.  The threat of delayed compensation puts 
pressure on the victims to settle their claims for less than full value in 
order to achieve more rapid payment and permits the polluter to at least 
temporarily shift the cost of harm to the victim.33  Interim payments are 
a particularly beneficial remedy to counteract delay-related harm.34  The 
expedited damages, moreover, better compensate populations that are 
already disproportionately impacted by the negative externalities of 
pollution-related activities.  
Interim and economic damage payments invoke a number of 
concerns about unlimited liability and over-deterrence, procedural and 
substantive due process, and judicial economy.35  Those concerns raise 
important issues that need to be addressed by structuring a system 
 
29.  U.S DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL TOXIC SUBSTANCE 
INCIDENTS PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 8 (2011). 
30.  Palmer, supra note 1, at 109. 
31.  Herbert Bernstein, Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss Under American Tort 
Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 111, 113 (Supp. 1998); John C.P. Goldberg, Liability for Economic 
Loss in Connection with the Deepwater Horizon Spill, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 335, 337 (2011); 
Note, The Limits of Liability: Can Alaska Oil Spill Victims Recover Pure Economic Loss?, 10 
ALASKA L. REV. 87, 102 (1993). 
32.  See Benjamin R. Civiletti, Zeroing in on the Real Litigation Crisis:  Irrational Justice, 
Needless Delays, Excessive Costs, 46 MD. L. REV. 40, 40, 48 (1986) (“The real [civil justice 
system] crisis can be seen from the fact that injured parties carry the burden of their injury 
under appalling circumstances for extreme periods of time and at staggering economic and 
human costs. . . . [¶] The delay and cost involved in the tort litigation system, in themselves, 
supply ample justification for civil justice reforms . . . .  Reforms are needed to assure 
reasonable, timely compensation, to preserve access to the courts for injured parties, and to 
discourage wrongful conduct.”). 
33.  See id. at 44. 
34.  See id. at 46–47. 
35.  See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk, Interim Attorney’s Fee Awards Against the Federal 
Government, 68 N.C. L. REV. 117, 121–25 (1990); Davis, supra note 5, at 8–9. 
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designed to facilitate interim payments and pure economic damages 
while minimizing procedural and substantive due process impact, that 
adopts scope-limiting rules to reduce concerns about unlimited liability, 
and that is judicially manageable.  
This Article is comprised of three parts.  Part II describes the type of 
economic damages private victims receive and the timing of when those 
victims receive compensation.  It also evaluates why the current 
recovery system is inadequate to compensate private-party victims of 
hazardous releases.  Part III analyzes the benefits of and concerns with 
pure economic damage compensation.  Part IV addresses the benefits of 
and concerns with interim payments.  Understanding and responding to 
these concerns helps shape an approach that best balances competing 
interests. 
II. ECONOMIC DAMAGES FOR PRIVATE-PARTY HAZARDOUS 
RELEASE VICTIMS 
Hazardous releases leave victims in a precarious position.  Victims 
are in immediate need of funds to address the consequences.36  While 
some victims suffer physical harm to person or property, many do not.37  
However, most will incur some degree of economic harm that might 
include lost earnings or job opportunities.38  Many release victims have 
no legal recourse to recover these damages.39  Even for damages that are 
compensable, the long time delay between injury and claims payment 
can be costly and anxiety-provoking.40   
This Section addresses the question of what economic damages spill 
victims are entitled to recover and when they receive compensation.  
Part A addresses private-party recovery for economic loss, Part B 
addresses when release victims receive interim damages, and Part C 
describes the role of insurance to compensate victims. 
 
36.  See, e.g., Lt. Col. Millard, Disaster Claims—Advance and Emergency Partial 
Payments, ARMY LAW., June 1995, at 63. 
37.  See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 1, at 109. 
38.  See, e.g., Clark, supra note 3, at 511–12. 
39.  See id. at 513. 
40.  By way of but one example, the Exxon Valdez claimants had to wait nearly twenty 
years to receive their damage award.  See J. Steven Picou, When the Solution Becomes the 
Problem:  The Impacts of Adversarial Litigation on Survivors of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7 
U. ST. THOMAS L. REV. 68, 73–75 (2009). 
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A. The Scope of Economic Damage Recovery 
The pure economic loss rule took hold in German, English, and 
English common-law-influenced systems around the late nineteenth 
century.41  In 1927, it was adopted into admiralty law in Robins Dry 
Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint.42   
The Robins Dry Dock case involved damage to a boat that was 
under time charter.43  After the owners brought the boat in for routine 
docking, the dry dock operators negligently damaged the boat’s 
propeller.44  The time charterer plaintiffs brought action to recover for 
the lost use of the boat while the propeller damage was being repaired.45  
The Court held that the plaintiffs could not recover because, as time 
charterers, they were not the boat owners and therefore had not 
personally suffered property damage.46  Put another way, they had 
suffered non-compensable pure economic loss, not compensable loss 
that was a consequence of damage to their personal property. 
What is now known as the “Rule in Robins Dry Dock” is 
coterminous with the preexisting common law “pure economic loss 
rule.”  Case law involving hazardous releases has overwhelmingly 
embraced this exclusionary recovery rule, normalizing as a general legal 
matter a broad bar to recovering for economic loss that is not 
accompanied by physical injury or personal property damage.47 
The pure economic loss rule is so effective a recovery bar that an 
exception developed for commercial fisherman and other users of the 
sea.48  This “commercial fisherman exception” has been justified on a 
 
41.  Palmer, supra note 1, at 114. 
42.  275 U.S. 303 (1927); Palmer, supra note 1, at 116–19 (discussing maritime law’s 
adoption of the rule). 
43.  275 U.S. at 307. 
44.  Id. 
45.  Id. 
46.  Id. at 308–09.  
47.  See, e.g., Lloyd’s Leasing Ltd. v. Conoco, 868 F.2d 1447, 1448–49 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(denying pure economic loss claims to over 375 claimants in oil spill in Calcasieu River Bar 
Channel); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (denying 
various claimants including shipping interests, marine and boat rental operators, seafood 
enterprises, and tackle and bait shops pure economic loss claims in PCP spill into Mississippi 
River Gulf); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) (denying pure economic 
loss claims for 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill).  But see Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Co., 523 F. Supp. 
975 (E.D. Va. 1981) (permitting charter boat owners, marinas, and tackle and bait operators 
to maintain suit for pure economic loss while dismissing claims of seafood wholesalers, 
retailers, processors, distributors, and restaurateurs). 
48.  Note, supra note 31, at 102. 
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variety of grounds, most frequently on the basis of a special relationship 
between the tortfeasor and “fisherman and other users of the sea” 
requiring the tortfeasor to “refrain from negligent conduct . . . which . . . 
reasonably and foreseeably could have been anticipated to cause a 
diminution in the aquatic life.”49  Thus, fisherman, crabbers, oystermen, 
and shrimpers have been compensated their pure economic loss under 
this “commercial fisherman” exception.50  
In some jurisdictions, another exception to the pure economic loss 
rule is given to family members to compensate them for lost familial 
services when their family member was negligently injured or killed.51  
The underlying theory is that the family member suffered a violation of 
a “quasi-property right” or was in a special relationship status with the 
victim and they consequently suffered economic harm.52  
Legislatures have also expanded pure economic loss recovery to 
private-party oil spill claimants.53  For example, the 1990 Oil Spill Act 
(OPA) expanded oil release liability to permit private-party recovery of 
“[d]amages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity 
due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal 
property, or natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any 
claimant.”54  As a result of OPA’s express language and legislative 
 
49.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 568) (internal quotation 
mark omitted). 
50.  See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 479–80, 508 n.21 (2008) 
(recognizing a limited exception for pure economic loss by commercial fisherman); Alaska 
Native Class v. Exxon Corp., 104 F.3d 1196, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 1997) (granting pure economic 
loss to native Alaskans who lost fishing resources); M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1049–50 
(granting limited exception for pure economic loss recovery for commercial fisherman, 
oystermen, shrimpers, and crabbers who used the embargoed water); Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 
570 (granting limited exception for pure economic loss recovery for commercial fisherman); 
see also Perry, supra note 7, at 22–23. 
51.  Bernstein, supra note 31, at 113. 
52.  Id. at 113–14. 
53.  See Goldberg, supra note 31, at 337. 
54.  33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (2012).  OPA also codifies private recovery for economic 
loss accompanied by physical injury by including “[d]amages for injury to, or economic losses 
resulting from destruction of, real or personal property, which shall be recoverable by a 
claimant who owns or leases that property” and provides a right of recovery for economic loss 
associated with lost subsistence use by including “[d]amages for loss of subsistence use of 
natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant who so uses natural resources 
which have been injured, destroyed or lost, without regard to the ownership or management 
of the resources.”  Id. § 2702(b)(2)(B)–(C). 
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history, courts now award pure economic damages for victims of oil 
spills.55   
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA) also 
imposes strict liability for pure economic loss associated with oil 
releases.56  TAPAA expands oil release liability to permit recovery to 
“all damaged parties, public or private, without regard to fault for such 
damages, and without regard to ownership of any affected lands, 
structures, fish, wildlife, or biotic or other natural resources relied upon 
by Alaska Natives, Native organizations, or others for subsistence or 
economic purposes.”57  TAPAA is limited to oil releases stemming from 
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System.58   
A small number of states have enacted legislation to include private 
recovery for pure economic loss.59  While federal victim compensation 
bills have periodically been introduced in the Legislature, they have not 
met with success.  For example, Congress considered victim 
compensation legislation when passing Superfund; however, the issue 
was too politically controversial and it was ultimately deleted from the 
bill.60 
A few courts have expanded recovery for pure economic loss to 
cover claimants in chemical spill cases.61  Cases such as these, although a 
rarity, can serve as the basis for release litigants to argue that the 
common or maritime law should be expanded to permit pure economic 
recovery for hazardous substance releases. 
 
55.  See, e.g., S. Port Marine, LLC v. Gulf Oil Ltd. P’ship, 234 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2000); 
Secko Energy, Inc. v. M/V Margaret Chouest, 820 F. Supp. 1008, 1014–15 (E.D. La. 1993). 
56.  43 U.S.C. §§ 1651–1656 (2012). 
57.  Id. § 1653(a)(1). 
58.  Id. §§ 1652(a), 1653(a). 
59.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.03.822–.824 (2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.05 
(West 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12.3-4 (2007). 
60.  Theodore L. Garrett, Compensating Victims of Toxic Substances:  Issues Concerning 
Proposed Federal Legislation, 13 ENV. L. REP. 10172, 10172 (1983). 
61.  See Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Co., 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981) (allowing limited 
category of claimants to bring action for pure economic loss caused by Kepone spill into 
Chesapeake Bay); People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 
1985) (allowing airline to bring action for pure economic loss after chemical spill from tank 
car caused evacuation of its office and lost profits).  
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B. The Timing of Damages:  Interim Payments 
Interim payments are granted when a claimant makes an evidentiary 
showing of entitlement to a damage award.62  Because they are partial 
and pre-final, interim payments are designed to provide victims with 
expeditious recovery.63  While it is possible that a payment may satisfy 
the full value of a particular claim, interim payments are typically partial 
payments and are not designed to compromise the claimant’s ability to 
pursue the entire outstanding value of a claim to which a victim may be 
entitled.64  A claimant’s final judgment is reduced by the amount of any 
interim payments received.65 
Interim damage payments are available to oil release victims.  At the 
same time that Congress provided a statutory strict liability mechanism 
to recover pure economic loss in OPA, Congress also provided for 
interim damage payments to timely recover that loss.66  OPA requires a 
responsible party to establish a procedure for handling short-term 
damage claims.67  Responsible parties must advertise the available 
claims procedures to potential claimants no later than fifteen days after 
they are designated a responsible party and continue that advertisement 
for no less than thirty days.68 
Courts will likely refrain from granting interim relief absent 
statutory authority like that contained in OPA.69  Court-ordered 
monetary interim relief is exceptional.  In the select instances where it is 
granted, it is typically limited to attorney fees, litigation costs, or both.  
For example, courts have sparingly awarded interim attorney fees and 
litigation costs when authorized by fee shifting statutes, in contexts such 
as civil rights,70 freedom of information,71 divorce,72 bankruptcy,73 and 
 
62.  See 33 U.S.C. § 2705(a) (2012); Hanrahan v. Hampton 446 U.S. 754, 758 (1980). 
63.  See Millard, supra note 36, at 63–64. 
64.  33 U.S.C. §§ 2705(a), 2713(d), 2715(b)(2). 
65.  See id. § 2713(d). 
66.  See id. § 2705.   
67.  Id. § 2705(a) (“The responsible party shall establish a procedure for the payment or 
settlement of claims for interim, short-term damages.”); see infra Part IV for additional detail 
about the structure of OPA’s interim payment system. 
68.  33 U.S.C. § 2714(b)(1). 
69.  See Palmer, supra note 1, at 129. 
70.  See, e.g., Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 & n.4 (1980) (holding § 1988 
authorized interim fee awards); Brown v. Marsh, 707 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1989) (permitting 
interim attorney’s fee awards against the United States in litigation under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act).   
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emergency school aid litigation.74  Even in those situations, they are 
granted in exceptional circumstances when justified for equitable 
reasons, such as leveling the litigation playing field or providing funds to 
facilitate potentially meritorious lawsuits that would not otherwise be 
brought.75  Courts have also recognized the authority of arbitral 
tribunals to issue interim awards under such statutes as the Federal 
Arbitration Act,76 the Military Personnel and Civilian Employees 
Claims Act,77 and the Military Claims Act.78  
Interestingly, other countries have more comfort with, and have 
established procedures for, interim damage awards.  For example, in 
England and Wales, interim payment may be awarded in catastrophic 
injury cases.79  A claimant needs to show that the interim payment is a 
reasonable proportion of the damages likely to be awarded to obtain 
 
71.  5 U.S.C. § 552 (A)(4)(E) (2012); 37A AM. JUR. 2D Freedom of Information Acts 
§§ 567, 574 (2013). 
72.  See, e.g., Young v. Young, 898 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (granting 
interim fees “to ensure that both parties to a dissolution case have similar access to counsel 
and that neither has an unfair ability to obtain legal assistance”); see also Kasm v. Kasm, 933 
So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
73.  Cf., e.g., In re Unitcast, Inc., 219 B.R. 741 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998). 
74.  See, e.g., Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 723–24 (1974) (holding 
Emergency School Aid Act allowed interim fee awards); Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 
717, 724 (9th Cir. 1988) (same). 
75.  See, e.g., Young, 898 So. 2d at 1077; Brown, 707 F. Supp. at 23–24. 
76.  James M. Gaitis, The Federal Arbitration Act: Risks and Incongruities Relating to the 
Issuance of Interim and Partial Awards In Domestic and International Arbitrations, 16 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 9 (2005) (“[E]ven in the absence of a statutory provision specifically 
authorizing arbitral tribunals to issue interim and partial awards that are final in nature, 
federal courts have long acknowledged that tribunals have such authority.”). Congress 
indirectly codified this authority in the 1988 amendments to the FAA.  Id.   
77.  See Millard, supra note 36, at 63–64 (discussing implementing regulations to the 
Military Personnel and Civilian Employees Claims Act authorizing emergency partial 
payments for damage to or loss of personal property incident to natural or manmade disasters 
caused by “fire, flood, hurricane or other unusual occurrences”). 
78.  See id. at 65 (discussing authorization in the Military Claims Act for advance partial 
payments to alleviate immediate hardship in situations where the victim or the victim’s family 
have an “immediate need for food, clothing, shelter, medical, burial expense or other 
necessities”).   
79.  See Gordon Exall, Interim Payments and the Seriously Injured Claimant: Somewhere 
to Live or Down at EELES?, CIV. LITIG. BRIEF (June 24, 2013), http://civillitigationbrief.wor
dpress.com/2013/06/24/interim-payments-and-the-seriously-injured-claimant-somewhere-to-li
ve-or-down-at-eeles/, archived at http://perma.cc/XBQ7-RJ47. 
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interim payment.80  Interim payment is not restricted to past losses but 
may also include future loss.81   
C. The Availability of Public and Private Insurance 
Currently, insurance is the available compensation mechanism for 
most private spill victims’ pure economic loss.  Some commentators 
argue that excluding liability is a more efficient means of loss spreading 
because it provides victims with incentives to self-protect against loss at 
a lower administrative cost than shifting liability to the polluter.82  
Potential victims who are vulnerable to harm can purchase first-party 
insurance, like business interruption coverage, to cover eventual loss.83  
Governments also may provide public, or social, insurance.84 
However, insurance is not a comprehensive gap filler.  First-party 
insurance may not be available or widely obtained.85  The extent to 
which potential victims are in fact availing themselves of insurance is 
uncertain.  Potential victims might not purchase advance protection 
because they are inattentive to their needs, fail to appreciate their risk, 
choose to ignore their risk, or take a chance that they will not be 
injured.86  Only those most aware of their potential risk, in a financial 
position to insure against it, and desirous of taking advanced protective 
measures will be motivated to preemptively purchase insurance.87  When 
there is no insurance, the cost of pollution is either born by the victim or 
publicly absorbed through social insurance, the costs of which are 
diffusely spread to the tax base.88  
 
80.  See Cobham Hire Services Ltd. v. Eeles, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 204, [2], [2010] 1 
W.L.R. 409 (Eng.). 
81.  See, e.g., Harris v. Roy, [2010] QBD (Eng.) (rejecting the argument that interim 
payment was confined to past loss); see also, e.g., Szatmari v. Oxford Radcliffe Hospitals NHS 
Trusts, [2012] EWHC (QB) 1339 (Eng.) (interim payments to fund housing or vehicular 
adaptations to address resulting disabilities); Kirby v. Ashford & St. Peters Hospital NHS 
Trust, [2011] EWHC (QB) 624 (Eng.); Exall, supra note 79.  
82.  See, e.g., Perry, supra note 7, at 20. 
83.  See Fleming James, Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by 
Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 52 (1972). 
84.  Id.   
85.  See Stephen D. Sugarman, Roles of Government in Compensating Disaster Victims, 
ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Jan. 26, 2007, at 6, http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?article=1093&context=ils, archived at http://perma.cc/K3PT-VETJ. 
86.  Id. at 8.   
87.  See id.  
88.  See James, supra note 83, at 53. 
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III. PURE ECONOMIC DAMAGES:  BENEFITS AND CONCERNS 
Pure economic damages advance a number of tort goals.  They 
provide more comprehensive victim compensation; promote 
environmental justice, including distributive, procedural, corrective, and 
social justice; and deter tortious behavior.  A proper structure advances 
these goals while responding to concerns about unlimited liability and 
judicial manageability.   
A. Compensation Benefits 
As discussed in Part II, there is a gap in tort coverage for many 
hazardous release victims.  Often, releases damage un-owned resources 
like water, air, wildlife, and other natural resources, and the resulting 
harm is of a purely economic nature.89  Because common and maritime 
law routinely denies recovery in such situations—and because the 
existing exceptions for fisherman, family members, and victims of oil 
releases are unduly restrictive—problematic gaps in compensation 
remain for many other hazardous release victims.  Expanding liability 
for pure economic damages serves to better fill in those gaps. 
Victim compensation, or full and fair redress of civil legal wrongs, is 
one of the essential goals of tort law.90  Pure economic damage recovery 
provides more complete and fair compensation.  Because spills are 
indeed “excellent engines of pure economic loss,” permitting recovery 
better responds to the type of harm many release victims will 
experience.91   
B. Environmental Justice Benefits 
In a variety of ways, expanding hazardous release liability to cover 
pure economic loss provides a more environmentally just compensation 
system.  While there is no uniformly agreed upon definition of 
“environmental justice,” the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
defines it as “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all 
people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect 
to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental 
 
89.  Palmer, supra note 1, at 109. 
90.  John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation, 
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 435 (2006).  
91.  See Palmer, supra note 1, at 109 (discussing oil spills). 
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laws, regulations, and policies.”92  Fair treatment, in turn, requires that 
“no group of people should bear a disproportionate share of the 
negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial, 
governmental and commercial operations or policies.”93  To be 
“meaningfully involved” means that people must “have an opportunity 
to participate in decisions about activities that may affect their 
environment and/or health,” their involvement must be such that it can 
influence regulatory decisions, their concerns must be considered by 
decision makers, and decision makers must facilitate the involvement of 
potential victims.94  Robert R. Kuehn proposes an approach to 
environmental justice issues that evaluates how well they achieve 
distributive justice, procedural justice, corrective justice, and social 
justice.95  These justice theories are all components of fair and 
meaningful environmental justice.96 
Framed through the lens of distributive justice, enlarging the class of 
victims entitled to pure economic recovery redistributes the risk of 
hazardous substance releases, providing a more equitable distribution 
among the parties.97  This risk redistribution is particularly beneficial for 
socioeconomically disadvantaged populations and communities of 
color.98  Research focusing on the 2010 Gulf oil spill reflects that there 
were documented disproportionate impacts that the Gulf spill had on 
such populations and existing legal mechanisms were insufficient to 
protect vulnerable populations.99  Expanding pure economic damages to 
 
92.  Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/enviro
nmentaljustice/basics/ejbackground.html (last updated May 24, 2012), archived at http://perm
a.cc/5VL8-279Z. 
93.  Id. 
94.  Id.  See Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 10681 (2000) for an interesting history and discussion of “environmental justice” 
definitions. 
95.  Kuehn, supra note 94. 
96.  Id. 
97.  For purposes of environmental justice, distributive justice means the right to “the 
same distribution of goods and opportunities as anyone else has or is given” and includes not 
only the equitable distribution of the burdens of polluting activities (i.e., a shifting or 
redistribution of risks) but also a lowering of risks.  Id. at 10683–84.  Distributive justice 
focuses on fairly distributed outcomes, not on the process of arriving at those outcomes.  See 
id. 
98.  See Hari M. Osofsky et al., Environmental Justice and the BP Deepwater Horizon 
Oil Spill, 20 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 99, 101, 110–27 (2012) (analyzing the amount of spill waste 
and health impacts that disproportionately impacted socioeconomically disadvantaged or of 
color communities). 
99.  See id. at 102. 
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a larger category of release victims eases an already disproportionate 
burden associated with the negative externalities from hazardous 
substance industries.100  Expanded liability better distributes those risks, 
minimizing the disparate impact.  It also achieves victim equity, giving at 
least the same damages to victims of non-oil hazardous releases as those 
to which oil release victims are entitled.101   
Expanded liability promotes victim access to the justice system. This 
facilitates procedural justice by empowering those who otherwise lack 
political power to tap into the justice system.  Through access, these 
groups can potentially change pollution-creating policies and 
practices.102   
Viewed through a corrective justice lens, there is a duty to repair 
victim losses.103  As between victims of pollution and the polluter, the 
costs of pollution should be born by the party creating the pollution 
even if it extends liability or creates a greater burden on courts.  Shifting 
liability makes a strong statement that pollution is a wrong that must be 
rectified. 
C. Deterrence Benefits 
One of tort law’s primary functions is deterring undesirable 
conduct.104  “Legal theory suggests that when liability rules are narrow in 
scope, categorically exclude certain forms of loss, and permit the spiller 
to perfect various defenses, the spiller may not have sufficient incentives 
to invest in prevention and safety.”105  
But the actual deterrent effect that additional hazardous substance 
liability may yield is arguably nominal or nonexistent.106  Entities that 
deal in hazardous substances are already exposed to potentially large-
scale liability for such things as environmental remediation and loss 
 
100.  See id. at 194–95. 
101.  See generally Daniel A. Farber, Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change, Katrina, 
and 9/11: Exploring Liability for Extraordinary Risks, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1075, 1125–26 
(2009). 
102.  Procedural justice refers to procedurally equal treatment of “equal concern and 
respect in the political decision about how . . . goods and opportunities are to be distributed.” 
Kuehn, supra note 94, at 10688. 
103.  Id. at 10693 (“Corrective justice involves not only the just administration of 
punishment to those who break the law, but also a duty to repair the losses for which one is 
responsible.”).   
104.  Farber, supra note 101, at 1114. 
105.  Palmer, supra note 1, at 110. 
106.  Perry, supra note 7, at 17. 
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accompanied by physical injury or property damage.107  Even if there is 
some deterrent effect, the costs involved in shifting liability may 
outweigh the additional deterrence. 
Another concern is that allowing recovery for pure economic loss 
could result in a liability shift for private loss, or “wealth transfers,” that 
do not reflect true social costs.108  When liability shifts for private loss 
rather than true social costs, there is a concern it will lead to over-
deterrence.109  This can cause those who handle hazardous waste to 
unduly invest in protective mechanisms and pass those costs along to 
consumers: 
According to economic theory, efficient deterrence requires 
internalization of the social cost of every inefficient act by the 
actor.  In assessing social costs, it is important not to add private 
losses that reflect “wealth transfers,” namely diminution of 
personal wealth that generates corresponding gains to others.  
Such gains do not mitigate the private loss, but cancel it out in 
the calculation of the externalized social cost.  Internalization of 
private losses irrespective of the parallel gains may lead to over-
deterrence.  Arguably, many [pure] economic losses correspond 
to resulting economic gains.  If the competitors of an interrupted 
business can easily increase their production during the 
interruption at no cost beyond normal production costs, their 
gain will offset the unfortunate business’ loss.110 
Financial responsibility requirements like mandatory insurance to 
cover liability risk have the potential to increase deterrence.111  Financial 
requirements increase health and safety by internalizing the cost of 
significant accident risks.112  Such requirements also reduce levels of 
risky behavior by preventing insolvency as a way to externalize cost and 
encouraging insurers to regulate risky activities as a precondition of 
 
107.  See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–62 (2012) (OPA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–92 (2012) 
(Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); id. §§ 9601–28 (Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act). 
108.  See, e.g., Davis, supra note 5, at 13–14. 
109.  See, e.g., id. 
110.  Perry, supra note 7, at 16 (footnotes omitted). 
111.  Jeffrey Kehne, Note, Encouraging Safety Through Insurance-Based Incentives: 
Financial Responsibility for Hazardous Wastes, 96 YALE L.J. 403, 405 (1986) (“Financial 
responsibility provisions improve safety by preventing insolvency from undermining the 
deterrent effects of liability rules.”). 
112.  See id. at 404–06. 
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coverage.113  Insurers “encourage safety improvements . . . [by 
conducting] risk assessments that precede the issuance or renewal of 
policies, [selecting] premium schedules that categorize insured[] 
[parties] based on differences in expected losses, and [utilizing] contract 
provisions that require . . . specified safety practices.”114   
D. Unlimited Liability and Over-Deterrence Concerns 
The most widely invoked concern about expanding pure economic 
damage recovery is that it exposes defendants to a potentially unlimited 
scope of liability and may lead to over-deterrence.115  Without 
mechanisms to limit liability, the “ripple effect” potential for open-
ended claims is significant.  One spill can implicate a seemingly limitless 
number of claimants, including businesses, customers, creditors, 
suppliers, employees, shareholders, and consumers near the spill locus 
or around the globe.  In spill situations, “where the number of victims is 
not only uncertain ex ante but potentially enormous, where procedural 
mechanisms reduce per capita cost of litigation thereby inducing victims 
to sue, and where the defendant may be a deep-pocketed corporation,” 
the potential for open-ended exposure is realistic.116  There is further 
concern this could lead to disproportionate liability between the relative 
culpability of the wrong and the amount of liability.117  At its core, the 
pure economic loss exclusion is a proximate cause rule aimed at limiting 
the scope of a defendant’s liability to avoid shifting costs for 
unforeseeable damages or damages that are too remote from the harm 
to justify the imposition of liability.118 
Open-ended liability can burden responsible parties to the point of 
insolvency.  While there is a legitimate concern that catastrophic liability 
might lead to insolvency, the bankruptcy laws do permit 
reorganization.119  Also, catastrophic liability is itself a means of risk 
spreading.120   
 
113.  Id.  
114.  Id. at 406. 
115.  See, e.g., Farber, supra note 101, at 1078; James, supra note 83, at 45; Perry, supra 
note 7, at 12. 
116.  Perry, supra note 7, at 13. 
117.  Id. at 14; see also James, supra note 83, at 50. 
118.  See, e.g., Davis, supra note 5, at 27–30.   
119.  See Farber, supra note 101, at 1122–23. 
120.  Id. at 1122 (“If private firms have tort liability, the burden is put on the 
shareholders and thereby spread through the securities markets. . . .  To the extent that 
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Moreover, when there are limited funds to compensate victims, the 
result might be an inequitable distribution of those assets to the first 
claimants, leaving arguably more legally deserving claimants without 
compensation.121  Insolvent or low capitalized firms will pay the first 
claimants, leaving other worthy victims with little or no recovery.  The 
scope of liability might entirely deter organizations from entering 
markets that might otherwise be socially beneficial for them to engage 
in.122  
There are ways to provide certainty about the scope of liability.  
Alternatives include damage caps, financial assurance provisions, and 
proximate cause rules.  Certainty permits those dealing in hazardous 
substances to better prepare and insure contingencies.123  If the liability 
potential is too uncertain and vast, insurers might stop offering coverage 
or price the premium at a prohibitively high amount.124  This is 
problematic because losses are not optimally spread.125    
Damage caps are particularly effective at providing certainty as to 
the scope of liability.  For example, for offshore releases, OPA liability 
is limited to $75 million plus all remedial costs, and for onshore facilities, 
liability is limited to $350 million.126  In general, responsible parties are 
liable without limit only if the incident resulted from gross negligence, 
willful misconduct, a violation of operational safety regulations, or if the 
responsible party fails to report the incident or cooperate with removal 
activities.127   
The success of a capped damage system depends upon whether the 
cap is set at an amount that provides sufficient victim compensation and 
encourages safety measures while avoiding open-ended liability.  OPA’s 
damage cap has been widely criticized for being an insufficient 
compensation amount.  For example, one commentator refers to this as 
 
private insurers are in the market, the burden of covering catastrophic risks can be reduced if 
they are allowed to subrogate to the tort claims of their insureds.  In any event, to a much 
greater extent than is true of more easily insurable risks, such as routine auto accidents or 
house fires, the tort system’s ability to spread risks is a major advantage.”). 
121.  Some commentators posit that claimants with accompanying physical injury or 
property damage have superior claims than those who suffer a purely economic loss.  See, e.g., 
Perry, supra note 7, at 15. 
122.  Id. at 14–15. 
123.  Id. at 20. 
124.  Garrett, supra note 60, at 10176; Perry, supra note 7, at 15. 
125.  Perry, supra note 7, at 15. 
126.  33 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (2012).   
127.  Id. § 2704(c). 
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a figure “so paltry in relation to the potential costs of oil spills that, 
arguably, it would produce less safety than the old [pure economic loss] 
exclusionary rule.”128  When the cap is too low to satisfy victim loss, it 
provides insufficient compensation and creates equity problems because 
the earliest claimants may possibly tap the limit of the cap, leaving 
otherwise worthy victims without recourse.  
Financial assurance provisions, too, provide certainty.  The costs of 
increased liability can be spread through private or public insurance.  
Financial responsibility provisions can be included that require firms to 
post bonds or maintain sufficient insurance to cover the damage cap 
amount.129  When done in tandem with damage caps, there is a 
reasonable degree of certainty about the extent of liability.  In turn, this 
provides insurers with a more accurate ability to assess the level of risk 
and needed investment in safety measures.130  
Proximate cause rules also provide a level of certainty.  For example, 
liability can be expanded only to those victims who have a right to put 
the injured resource to commercial use.131  Another possibility is to 
expand liability only for victims that the defendant should have foreseen 
would incur economic loss.132  Further limitations can be placed on the 
types of hazardous substance releases that shift liability.133  Also, 
threshold minimum release quantities can be established to limit 
liability.134 
In the context of oil releases, scholarly disagreement exists about the 
extent to which OPA contains proximate cause limitations on the class 
 
128.  Palmer, supra note 1, at 111; see also Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The 
BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 399–400 
(2014) (referring to OPA’s cap as “almost quaint”).  Note that a 2012 report by the 
Department of Homeland Security reflects that OPA’s $75 million dollar statutory cap has 
been exceeded once for an offshore facility with the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon and 
Macondo Well; once for an onshore facility with the Enbridge Pipeline release; and fifty-nine 
times from offshore vessels.  See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIL POLLUTION ACT 
LIABILITY LIMITS IN 2012, at iii (2012), available at www.uscg.mil/npfc/docs/PDFs/Reports/Li
ability_Limits_Report_2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J5S6-KE8G. 
129.  See Kehne, supra note 111, at 403. 
130.  See id. at 410. 
131.  See Goldberg, supra note 31, at 337. 
132.  See Clark, supra note 3, 549–53. 
133.  See Clark, supra note 3, at 549. 
134.  Cf. A&W Smelter & Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1110–11 (9th 
Cir. 1998). 
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of claimants entitled to recover pure economic damages.135  In OPA’s 
broadest reading, “any claimant” may recover pure economic lost 
profits or earnings upon proving (i) the victim incurred economic loss, 
and (ii) that “but for” the release the victim’s economic loss would not 
have occurred.136  This reading would permit recovery by claimants far 
removed from where the release actually occurred.137 
Kenneth Feinberg appears to have required a showing of proximate 
causation in order to receive interim payments from the Gulf Coast 
Claims Facility (GCCF) in response to the 2010 Gulf oil spill.138  
However, the claims paid were generally expansive.  For example, 
compensated GCCF claimants included hotels, restaurants, real estate 
agents and developers, retail businesses, builders, contractors, doctors, 
veterinarians, small and large businesses, and individuals living 
paycheck to paycheck, unable to rely on savings to get by while claims 
were being processed.139 
John C.P. Goldberg argues that OPA is proximally limited to 
situations where claimants can prove that their economic loss was 
caused because the spill “has damaged, destroyed or otherwise rendered 
physically unavailable to them property or resources that they have a 
right to put to commercial use.”140  Vernon Valentine Palmer, on the 
other hand, argues that OPA does not contain a proximate cause 
limitation.141  Rather, he argues OPA contains only “a unitary cause-in-
fact analysis” coupled with the question of whether the economic loss 
falls within the intended scope and purpose of OPA.142  Limitation on 
liability, he posits, is accomplished through OPA’s damage cap.143   
 
135.  Compare Goldberg, supra note 31, and Davis, supra note 5, at 27–30, with Palmer, 
supra note 1, 136–38.   
136.  See Goldberg, supra note 31, at 349. 
137.  See id. at 346–48 (citing examples). 
138.  BDO CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST CLAIMS 
FACILITY REPORT OF FINDINGS & OBSERVATIONS TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
38 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/66520126611210351178.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/FKB3-AUCT.  The GCCF claims eligibility criteria reflect that 
some attention was paid to issues of proximity to the locus of events.  See Palmer, supra note 
1, at 113 n.42. 
139.  BDO CONSULTING, supra note 138, at 47.   
140.  Goldberg, supra note 31, at 337 (emphasis added).  Ultimately, the GCCF did not 
adopt this approach, opting instead for a more expansive, claimant-favorable approach to 
proximate cause.  BDO CONSULTING, supra note 138, at 39 n.25. 
141.  Palmer, supra note 1, at 136–37. 
142.  Id. at 137. 
143.  Id. at 138. 
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OPA’s lack of clarity about the extent to which there are proximate 
cause limitations diminishes the benefits that greater clarity can provide.  
As much as possible, an effective system should provide clarity about 
the scope of liability.  
E. Judicial Manageability Concerns 
Another concern about expanding liability to cover pure economic 
loss is that it invites a flood of litigation that can overwhelm the court 
system.  Mass tort liability like that associated with asbestos exposure 
requires a meaningful investment of judicial time and resources; it is 
appropriate to think of the implications of expanding pure economic 
loss recovery with the lessons from mass tort litigation in mind.144  
While there are rightly concerns about judicial manageability, there 
are numerous potential mechanisms that can increase judicial 
effectiveness in handling voluminous cases.145  Procedural devices like 
consolidation and class action, improvements in civil procedure, moving 
compensation from the judiciary to an administrative agency, and 
placing some limits on the degree to which liability rules are expanded 
are all vehicles to increase judicial manageability.146   
IV. INTERIM PAYMENTS: BENEFITS AND CONCERNS 
Interim payments, too, advance a number of tort remedy goals.  
They provide faster, fuller, and fairer victim compensation.  They also 
further environmental justice.  A proper structure advances these goals 
while responding to due process and judicial manageability concerns.   
A. Compensation Benefits and Litigation-Related Trauma 
Interim payments facilitate more expeditious recovery that avoids at 
least some of the harm that victims incur when they are forced to bear 
the cost of their injuries.   The shorter the period of time that victims 
front the expense of their loss, the better positioned they are to avoid 
further costs.  Some victims do not have the money or are placed in 
severe financial difficulty by the cost of their harm.  Without interim 
 
144.  See, e.g., Farber, supra note 101, at 1104–07 (discussing the consequences of mass 
torts like asbestos litigation on the legal system). 
145.  Id. at 1106 (quoting AM. BAR ASS’N, RULE OF LAW IN TIMES OF MAJOR 
DISASTER 6 (2007), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_
build/litigation/rol_disaster.authcheckdam.pdf), archived at http://perma.cc/88SJ-VGZ2. 
146.  See id. at 1127–28; Perry, supra note 7, at 14. 
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funding, some victims will not be financially positioned to make sound 
health and lifestyle choices.   
Moreover, faster recovery potentially mitigates, although it might 
not fully alleviate, the amount of stressful entanglement a victim has 
with the litigation system.  Because interim payments provide early re-
shifting of the costs of hazardous release injuries, they minimize the 
amount of economic loss suffered and also mitigate a secondary type of 
harm social scientists describe as “litigation-related trauma.”147  
Litigation-related trauma refers to the harm litigants experience as a 
result of their exposure to the legal process.148  That trauma involves a 
variety of harmful effects correlated with a victim’s stressful interaction 
with and exposure to adversarial litigation.  Litigation-related trauma 
causes litigants to experience a variety of symptoms that in some 
instances mimic Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), including 
anxiety, sleeplessness, depression, obsessive fixation on litigation, panic 
attack, stress, and fear.149  While all litigants experience a diverse array 
of perceptions and feelings about litigation, as a general matter, 
litigation tends to involve some degree of litigation-related trauma.150 
 
147.  Scholarship reflects such classification labels as “Litigation Response Syndrome,” 
and “Forensic Stress Disorder,” characterized by anxiety, depression, and stress.  See, e.g., 
Larry J. Cohen & Joyce H. Vesper, Forensic Stress Disorder, 25 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 
(2001) (discussing Forensic Stress Disorder); Paul R. Lees-Haley, Litigation Response 
Syndrome: How Stress Confuses the Issues, 56 DEF. COUNS. J. 110 (1989) (discussing 
Litigation Response Syndrome); Tamara Relis, Civil Litigation from Litigants’ Perspectives: 
What We Know and What We Don’t Know About the Litigation Experience of Individual 
Litigants, 25 STUD. L., POL. & SOC’Y, 151, 179–82 (2002) (discussing litigant anxiety). 
148.  Marvin H. Firestone & Robert I. Simon, Intimacy Verses Advocacy: Attorney–
Client Sex, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 679, 684 (1992) (“The legal client often experiences significant 
psychological stress during the litigation process.  Some litigants become so distressed that 
they are rendered dysfunctional.  Symptoms of anxiety, depression, and other manifestations 
of mental disorders occur.  A Litigation Response Syndrome (LRS) has been described [as a 
response to] the stress of being involved in litigation.  Anxiety and depression are the most 
common manifestations.  Such symptoms may interfere with the capacity of these litigants to 
act appropriately in their own interests and cause them to rely excessively on their attorneys 
for guidance.” (footnote omitted)). 
149.  See, e.g., Cohen & Vesper, supra note 147, at 3–4; Firestone & Simon, supra note 
148, at 684; Lees-Haley, supra note 147, at 112.  
150.  See Relis, supra note 147, at 153 (“Undeniably, litigants are hugely diverse in every 
conceivable respect including their perceptions and feelings. . . .  For some, litigation will be 
nothing new, whereas for others it will have great emotional significance. . . .  But throughout 
the findings lies a common thread.”). 
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Social scientists explain that hazardous release victims who become 
litigants are particularly vulnerable to litigation-related trauma.151  
Social scientists studying the psychological impact of litigation-related 
trauma on the victims of the Exxon Valdez oil spill found strong 
empirical evidence that those victims suffered particularly acute 
litigation-related trauma.152  Their initial spill-related trauma led to a 
second type of trauma—litigation stress—associated with adversarial 
litigation, trying to understand complex legal issues and recurrent 
thoughts about the spill.153  
Delay contributes to or compounds litigation-related injury.154 
“Delay has significant negative effects on claimants (even ‘successful 
claimants’ who eventually prevail) and society.”155  Prolonged exposure 
to litigation lengthens exposure to this stress-inducing trigger, thus 
potentially compounding this psychological injury.  
Interim payments have the potential to mitigate litigation-related 
injury by minimizing the length of victim exposure to litigation and by 
providing expedited financial compensation that can reduce the amount 
of the victim’s general financial anxiety.  It reduces the amount of time 
 
151.  See Lewis Robert Shreve, Note, Lessons from Exxon-Valdez: Employing Market 
Forces to Minimize the Psychological Impact on Oil Spill Plaintiffs, 35 LAW & PSYCHOL. 
REV. 239, 243 (2011) (“When litigation is in response to a major disaster, its psychological 
effects can be more severe, often significantly worsening the plights of these plaintiffs.”); see 
also J. Steven Picou, Brent K. Marshall & Duane A. Gill, Disaster, Litigation, and the 
Corrosive Community, 82 SOC. FORCES 1493, 1498 (2004).  Spill disaster victims experience 
two discrete harmful events.  Both the primary spill trauma and the secondary litigation-
related trauma create qualitative and quantitative harm to spill victims.  See Brent K. 
Marshall, J. Steven Picou & Jan R. Schlichtmann, Technological Disasters, Litigation Stress, 
and the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 26 LAW & POL’Y 289, 291–98 
(2004); Shreve, supra (applying literature on litigation-related psychological harm to the Gulf 
oil spill context and advocating for a wider use of market-valuation of claims to minimize 
injury). 
152.  Picou et al., supra note 151, at 1497, 1514; Shreve, supra note 151, at 243. 
153.  See Picou, supra note 40, at 80; Picou et al., supra note 151, at 1515 (“Our findings 
suggest that the legal system itself can become a secondary disaster, exacerbating and 
prolonging psychological stress and perceived community damage.  Indeed, as technological 
disasters increase and as natural disasters increasingly are viewed as human caused, the legal 
system in an already litigious society will play an even more prominent role in postdisaster 
damage awards.”). 
154.  See Relis, supra note 147, at 170 (“Though few empirical examples exist to prove 
that delays actually result in injustice, what is known is that delays are and have historically 
been common reasons for litigants’ distress.”); see also Daniel W. Shuman, When Time Does 
Not Heal: Understanding the Importance of Avoiding Unnecessary Delay in the Resolution of 
Tort Cases, 6 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 880, 881 (2000).   
155.  See Shuman, supra note 154, at 882. 
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in which victims need to outlay or borrow funds during the injury 
period.  This minimizes interest payments victims make on borrowed 
funds, penalties paid if unable to make payments, and any attendant 
negative credit impact.  In turn, it maximizes the extent to which victims 
can invest and realize a return on their own funds.  While interim 
payments might not expedite final resolution of litigation, they can 
alleviate some of the stress associated with delayed claims payment. 
B. Environmental Justice Benefits and the Story of the 2010 Gulf Oil 
Spill Interim Payment Process 
As discussed in Part II, hazardous releases and attendant protracted 
litigation can have particularly pronounced impact on socioeconomically 
disadvantaged populations and persons of color.156  Long delays between 
harm and compensation further injure these already-burdened 
victims.157  
In addition to economic harm, release victims also face stigma and 
discrimination.  Social scientists Johan M. Havenaar and Wim van den 
Brink describe the social rejection and discrimination that victims of 
toxicological disasters experience: 
Victims of toxicological disasters may suffer from discrimination, 
as though they were carriers of some mysterious and noxious 
[contagion].  Lifton described how survivors of the nuclear 
bombings of Hiroshima, the so called “Hibakusha,” suffered 
from discrimination, for example as marriage candidates.  Social 
rejection and discrimination of evacuees and inhabitants from 
contaminated regions has been reported following many 
toxicological events, for example, after the Seveso accident, the 
Love Canal crisis, and in victims exposed to asbestos and 
pesticides.158  
Social scientist J. Steven Picou focused on a variant of this 
phenomenon known as the “corrosive community.”159  The corrosive 
 
156.  See generally Osofsky et al., supra note 98, at 149–50.   
157.  Id.  (“To the extent that plaintiffs who are low-income or persons of color win 
monetary settlements or at trial, this compensation may alleviate some harms incurred by the 
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.  On the other hand, long delays and eventual losses may 
strain an already-burdened population.”). 
158.  Johan M. Havenaar & Wim van den Brink, Psychological Factors Affecting Health 
After Toxicological Disasters, 17 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 359, 362 (1997) (citations 
omitted). 
159.  Picou, supra note 40, at 79–80. 
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community relates to certain characteristics displayed in communities 
affected by hazardous releases, such as “a loss of trust in civic 
institutions, social isolation, group conflict, mental health problems, 
deteriorating social relationships, and . . . ‘corrosive social cycles.’”160  
Providing early compensatory funds shifts money toward, not from, 
already-stigmatized communities.  This can help mitigate some of the 
corrosive community effects in the aftermath of release disasters. 
Interim payments promote the goals of environmental justice by 
expediting payment to a wider category of victims, including groups or 
communities that are disproportionately impacted by environmental 
harm and that are most in need of expedited compensation.  To the 
extent victims are socioeconomically disadvantaged, they are most in 
need of timely interim financial compensation.  Early compensation 
better positions victims to make sound health and lifestyle choices 
because they will not be forced to bear the costs of the harm for lengthy 
periods of time. 
Also, interim payments further procedural justice goals because 
early funding facilitates victim access to the justice system without 
foreclosing a victim’s ability to obtain complete judicial relief.161  This 
empowers victims to possibly affect policy change through active 
litigation.  
The 2010 Gulf oil spill presented an opportunity to observe a mass 
interim claims payment process and draw environmental justice lessons 
from that experience.  BP’s interim claims payment obligations for the 
2010 spill derived from OPA.162  
Immediately after the well blowout, BP began processing interim 
damage claims.163  Initially, BP began processing such claims in house.  
BP set up 35 field offices in the Gulf region, received over 154,000 
 
160.  Id.; see also J. Steven Picou, Toxins in the Environment, Damage to the Community: 
Sociology and the Toxic Tort, in WITNESSING FOR SOCIOLOGY: SOCIOLOGISTS IN COURT 
211, 213–14 (Pamela J. Jenkins & Steve Kroll-Smith eds., 1996) (“Substantial sociological 
evidence exists to suggest that toxins in the environment contaminate more than air, water, or 
soil; they also damage the social fabric of a community, its neighborhoods, its families, and its 
residents’ self-esteem.  Environmental contamination, in short, is often both a biospheric and 
a sociological disaster.”).   
161.  See 33 U.S.C. § 2705(a) (2012). 
162.  See id. (“The responsible party shall establish a procedure for the payment or 
settlement of claims for interim, short-term damages.”). 
163.  See BDO CONSULTING, supra note 138, at 12 (describing how BP began paying 
interim compensation thirteen days after the explosion).  See supra Part I for further 
background information about the 2010 Gulf oil spill.  
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claims, and paid 127,000 payments.164  From May 3, 2010, to August 22, 
2010, BP paid over $399 million to claimants.165   
A little over three months after the spill, BP established and utilized 
a more formal claims processing facility called the GCCF.166  The GCCF 
was created under unique circumstances.  It resulted from a private 
negotiation between BP executives, President Obama, and other key 
members of the Obama Administration.167  After the meeting, BP 
acknowledged it was a responsible party under OPA.168  BP agreed to 
place $20 billion into a trust fund to establish the GCCF to fulfill BP’s 
legal obligations.169  This was well over OPA’s $75 million liability cap 
that many were concerned BP would invoke to limit its liability for the 
release.170  To “assure independence” from BP, the White House 
secured Kenneth Feinberg—a well-respected and seasoned mass claims 
processing executive—to administer the GCCF.171   
The GCCF, at least in theory, was an expedited, procedurally more 
accessible, and lower cost damage recovery alternative to litigation.172  
In the GCCF, claimants could obtain prompt payment and avoid filing 
or litigation fees.173  While claimants could—and many did—hire 
attorneys, professional fees were typically lower than litigation costs to 
 
164.  BDO CONSULTING, supra note 138, at 12. 
165.  Id. 
166.  The GCCF operated from August 2010 until it was closed in June 2012.  
FEINBERG, supra note 26, at 159; Important Announcement, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, 
http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/
G264-4PU8. 
167.  This was later referred to as a “woodshed lecture.”  FEINBERG, supra note 26, at 
129.  Kenneth Feinberg described the novelty as follows:  
Nothing like this had ever occurred in American history.  There was no new statute, 
no congressional hearings, no official administrative regulations, no court order—
just a private agreement orchestrated by the president to be implemented by BP and 
monitored by the Department of Justice.  An escrow agreement signed by BP and 
the department would formalize the commitment.  One of the world’s giant oil 
companies simply agreed to enter the claims compensation business. 
Id. 
168.  See Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the President After Meeting with BP 
Executives, WHITE HOUSE (June 16, 2010, 2:25 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/statement-president-after-meeting-with-bp-executives, archived at http://perma.cc/U7M
C-K8XZ.  
169.  Id. 
170.  Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 128, at 399–400. 
171.  Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 168.   
172.  Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 128, at 398. 
173.  See id. 
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reflect the decreased professional effort and risk involved in bringing a 
claim in the GCCF.174  Moreover, bringing a claim in the GCCF was a 
no-risk alternative to litigation because claimants could obtain interim 
relief and still file a lawsuit for claims that were not available in the 
GCCF such as punitive damages.175   
The GCCF offered claimants a menu of payment options that took 
place in two discrete phases.  In Phase I, the GCCF began paying 
“Emergency Advance Payments” for the loss of “earnings or profits, 
removal and clean-up costs, real or personal property damage, loss of 
subsistence use of natural resources and physical injury or death caused 
by the Spill by submitting a lesser level of documentation than would be 
required in Phase II”176  During Phase II, the GCCF offered three 
options:  (i) “interim payments” designed to compensate claimants for 
past losses, (ii) final payments designed to compensate claimants for 
past and future losses, and (iii) a “Quick Pay” cash out that was more 
streamlined and required less documentary support to substantiate a 
claim.177 
 
174.  See D. Theodore Rave, Settlement, ADR, and Class Action Superiority, 5 J. TORT. 
L. 91, 119 (2012).  
175.  OPA further clarifies that when the responsible party publicly advertises its 
designation, it also includes in that advertisement notice to claimants that interim payment 
shall not preclude recovery for the remainder of the claimant’s unpaid damages, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 2714(b)(2) (2012), and that claimants are protected in their ability to seek any unpaid 
damages or any other damages allowed by law beyond those recoverable in OPA.  
Id. § 2715(b)(2) (“Payment of such a claim shall not foreclose a claimant’s right to recovery of 
all damages to which the claimant otherwise is entitled under this Act or under any other 
law.”); id. § 2705(a) (“Payment or settlement of a claim for interim, short-term damages 
representing less than the full amount of damages to which the claimant ultimately may be 
entitled shall not preclude recovery by the claimant for damages not reflected in the paid or 
settled partial claim.”). 
176.  BDO CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST CLAIMS 
FACILITY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resour
ces/697201241917226179477.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/AB7J-6W3S.  Phase I began 
almost immediately upon the start of the GCCF on August 23, 2010, and concluded on 
November 23, 2010.  FEINBERG, supra note 26, at 159. 
177.  BDO CONSULTING, supra note 138, 34–35. 
As a general matter, the GCCF subjected claims filed during Phase II to more 
stringent documentation requirements than those applied . . . during Phase I . . . .  
[A]t the same time, it expanded the types of businesses . . . eligible for compensation 
and granted automatic eligibility to claimants . . . involved in businesses that were 
particularly reliant upon Gulf resources . . . . 
BDO CONSULTING, supra note 176, at 3. 
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Many GCCF claimants did not select the interim payment method, 
opting instead for either the quick or final settlement options.178  Both 
the quick and final pay options were final settlements.  Claimants were 
required to waive their future right to sue BP in order to obtain 
payment.179  Feinberg explained that phenomenon as follows:   
[C]laimants want closure.  It is unsettling and troublesome to be 
reminded over and over again about tragedy.  So although 
thousands of claimants would opt for an interim payment, many 
thousands more would decide to move on, close the oil spill 
chapter, and look to the future.  The choice was theirs.”180  
The GCCF was widely publicized as independent.181  The implication 
was that independent referred to structural autonomy from BP.182  
Unlike a PRP-led interim claims process, the GCCF actively marketed 
itself as autonomous.183  That independence, combined with Feinberg’s 
gravitas, imbued the GCCF with a more credible ability to assess 
damage claims than a BP-led claims process.184 
Attorneys in the multi-district litigation (MDL), however, argued 
that the GCCF was not truly autonomous but, rather, linked to BP.185  
They argued that the independent branding mislead GCCF claimants, 
who might have thought they were dealing with a fully independent 
entity when claimants settled their claims and waived their future right 
 
178.  FEINBERG, supra note 26, at 167–71. 
179.  Id. at 168, 171. 
180.  Id. at 171. 
181.  See, e.g., Office of the Press Sec’y, FACT SHEET: Claims and Escrow, WHITE 
HOUSE (June 16, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-claims-and-
escrow, archived at http://perma.cc/3F2L-VR6F (“Independent Claims Facility[:] A new, 
independent claims process will be created with the mandate to be fairer, faster, and more 
transparent in paying damage claims by individuals and businesses.  To assure independence, 
Kenneth Feinberg, who previously administered the September 11th Victim Compensation 
Fund, will serve as the independent claims administrator. . . .  Escrow Account[:] BP has 
agreed to contribute $20 billion over a four-year period at a rate of $5 billion per year, 
including $5 billion within 2010.  BP will provide assurance for these commitments by setting 
aside $20 billion in U.S. assets.” (capitalization omitted)). 
182.  See Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 168. 
183.  GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY: FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2011), http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/imported_pdfs/l
ibrary/assets/gccf-faqs.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/PMZ5-RSYW; see also FEINBERG, 
supra note 26, at 143–44. 
184.  See FEINBERG, supra note 26, at 144. 
185.  See Order and Reasons at 2–3, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 
MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 323866, at *1–2 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011), ECF No. 1098; see also In re 
Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 946 (E.D. La. 2012). 
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to sue BP.186  The MDL transferee Judge Carl Barbier agreed and held 
that, while Feinberg might independently evaluate the merits of claims, 
the GCCF and Feinberg were not neutral or independent of BP.187  
After settlement negotiations, BP agreed to pay about $7.8 billion 
for remaining economic claims.188  The GCCF closed its doors and a 
court-supervised successor entity administered by Pat Juneau began 
operations in its stead.189  BP, in turn, continued to process claims for 
any claimants who wished to deal directly with BP.190 
From an environmental justice standpoint, the GCCF lacked an 
essential element of procedural fairness because of its failure to 
transparently disclose all BP ties.  Because of its blended interim and 
final payment incentives, it served more as a claims resolution facility 
than one limited to interim claims processing.  This was problematic, 
particularly for those claimants who were socioeconomically vulnerable 
and in need of immediate funds.  It is difficult to assess whether all of 
those claimants would have finally resolved their claims in the GCCF, 
waiving future right to sue, if they had fully understood the linkage 
between BP and the GCCF and known that they could potentially join 
the MDL class action lawsuit.  In other words, did they truly “want 
closure” as explained by Feinberg, or were they drawn to the dangling 
carrot of immediate, easy, higher, and available payout?  While one can 
only guess at the answer, it is certainly conceivable that at least some of 
the claims can be explained in the latter fashion.  
To best comport with procedural justice, interim claims processes 
should have adequate safeguards to protect a victim’s ability to obtain 
complete relief and to understand the material affiliations of the parties 
with whom they are negotiating.  This is critical when interim claims 
processing is combined with final claims resolution. 
But in many other ways, the GCCF was a remarkable success.  
GCCF interim claims processing was significantly faster than litigation 
 
186.  See Order and Reasons, supra note 185, at 2–3. 
187.  Id. at 8–11.  The court held that this lack of transparency led to a misunderstanding 
by claimants, particularly by the claimants unrepresented by counsel, and ordered certain 
corrective measures such as requiring Feinberg, his law firm, and the GCCF to refrain from 
self-referencing as “independent” or “neutral,” and to disclose in all communications that 
they were acting on behalf of BP.  Id. at 12–14. 
188.  Campbell Robertson & John Schwartz, How a Gulf Settlement that BP Once 
Hailed Has Become Its Target, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2014, at A1. 
189.  See In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 904–05. 
190.  Claims, BP, http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/gulf-of-mexico-restoration/clai
ms-information.html (last visited June 5, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8NS7-Q5E4. 
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in terms of its ability to intake, process, and deliver short-term damage 
payments to claimants.  Consider that, during the one and one-half years 
of GCCF operations, the facility paid over $6.2 billion to claimants.191  
The number of claims processed was enormous.  Over 1 million claims 
were processed to over 220,000 individuals and businesses.192  Money 
flowed to victims almost immediately.193  In its second full month of 
operation, it paid over $840 million in emergency advance payments.194  
That is over $27 million per day.195  Most of those claims were for 
economic injury, not property damage.196  Lost earnings or profits 
constituted 90.3% of the claims received, 96.8% of the amounts paid, 
and 99.8% of the claims paid.197  It was not until the attorneys in the 
MDL took over the settlement process that litigation resulted in money 
flow to victims.  While it was not without flaws, in terms of overall 
immediate money flow to compensate victims of documented damages, 
interim claims processing in the GCCF worked. 
C. Due Process Concerns 
Interim relief implicates issues of procedural and substantive due 
process.  Because interim relief is by definition expeditious and 
provisional, defendants are concerned that payment prior to 
adjudication unfairly deprives them of due process of law.198  After all, if 
a defendant who has paid interim damages ultimately succeeds on the 
merits of a claim or defense, the defendant will have been made to pay 
damages unnecessarily.199  While the losing party may be forced to repay 
interim damages that are improperly awarded, this recoupment may not 
be feasible if the claimant is judgment proof or if the cost of seeking 
recoupment outweighs the likelihood of collection.  Defendants may 
also find themselves without recourse to seek contribution because 
other parties do not exist, have not been identified, or successfully 
 
191.  BDO CONSULTING, supra note 176, at 8.  
192.  Id. 
193.  See id. at 1. 
194.  Id. 
195.  Id. 
196.  Palmer, supra note 1, at 109.   
197.  BDO CONSULTING, supra note 138, at 4.  
198.  See, e.g., Trustees of the Tampa Maritime Ass’n–Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n 
Pension Plan & Trust v. S.E.L. Maduro (Fla.), Inc., 849 F. Supp. 1535, 1538 (M.D. Fla. 1994); 
Robbins v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 636 F. Supp. 641, 677–78 (N.D. Ill. 1986).  
199.  Cf. Sisk, supra note 35, at 121–23. 
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contest liability.  Thus, as a practical matter, the defendant may never be 
able to recapture improperly paid interim damages.   
One possible response is to limit recovery for interim damages to 
situations in which defendants are strictly liable for releases.  This 
ensures that defendants pay interim damages where there is a strong 
case that the defendants have a legal obligation to pay.  This would 
create a strict liability compensation scheme for private parties and 
provide a mechanism for interim recovery—the approach that Congress 
took in OPA.200  There are only three defenses under OPA, and thus, as 
a practical matter, responsible parties have little basis for denying 
liability.201  
While interim damages could be imposed for negligence, such fault-
based claims involve complex issues of reasonableness of behavior that 
cloud liability obligations.  And, although interim damages could be 
awarded upon a showing of a likelihood of success on the merits, 
requiring such an individualized showing greatly complicates the judicial 
burden, potentially outweighing the benefits of the device.  Moreover, it 
increases the chances of improper payment of interim damages.   
Another response to due process concerns is to limit interim 
payments to situations where there is a readily identifiable responsible 
party.202  As a practical matter, this limits the number of releases that 
will be suitable for interim payments because many releases are 
discovered that have weak or no factual traceability to an identified 
 
200.  See Palmer, supra note 1, at 137–38. 
201.  The defenses are an act of God, an act of war, or an act solely attributable to the 
negligence of a third party with whom the responsible party is not in a contractual 
relationship.  33 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012).  Note, too, that even in situations where a 
responsible party alleges the discharge was caused by a third party act or omission, OPA 
requires the responsible party to pay the claimant’s damages and then provides the 
responsible party the right to seek indemnity from that third party.  See id § 2702(d)(1)(B). 
202.  In OPA, the obligation to provide interim payments is triggered in situations when 
the oil release is traceable to an identifiable responsible party, typically the owner or operator 
of a vessel or the terminal from which the substance is emanating.  See 33 U.S.C. § 2714(a).  
The President designates a “responsible party,” at which point the responsible party has five 
days to contest the designation.  Id. § 2714(a) (“When the President receives information of 
an incident, the President shall, where possible and appropriate, designate the source or 
sources of the discharge . . . .”); id. § 2714(b)(1) (“If a responsible party or guarantor fails to 
inform the President, within 5 days after receiving notification of designation . . . , such party 
. . . shall advertise the designation . . . .”).  Once officially designated, then the responsible 
party must advertise its status, pay to clean up the release, and pay damages up to the limit of 
its liability.  See id. §§ 2704(a), 2714(b).  
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party.203  There are far stronger due process concerns about imposing 
liability when there is a weak nexus between the defendant and the 
release.  Limiting interim claims payments to situations where there is 
an identified party responsible for the contamination source addresses 
these concerns. 
To be protective of defendant’s due process concerns, payment of 
interim damages should not compromise a defendant’s ability to fully 
litigate available claims or defenses.  The legislature can include a 
provision clarifying that any interim payments made to claimants before 
a final disposition of a defendant’s liability is not an admission of 
liability nor does it prejudice the responsible party’s ability to prosecute 
any right, claim, or defense.204   
D. Judicial Manageability Concerns 
If the interim payments require judicial action, there is a concern 
that the time and resources required to evaluate each individual claim, 
address arguments over documentation, and handle appeals will be 
costly and overwhelming.205  It can be extremely expensive to handle 
small, individual claims, review documentary support, and secure any 
necessary expert assistance.206 
Interim payment does not need to be handled by the judiciary, 
however.  Payments can be processed privately by the responsible party, 
a third party, or by a delegated executive agency.207  By incentivizing 
 
203.  See Jason Scott Johnston, Is the Polluter Pays Principle Really Fundamental? An 
Economic Explanation of the Relative Unimportance of Environmental Liability and Taxes in 
US Environmental Law, in MARITIME POLLUTION LIABILITY AND POLICY: CHINA, EUROPE 
AND THE US 111, 116 (Michael G. Faure, Han Lixon & Shan Hongjun, eds., 2010). 
204.  See generally MD. CODE ANN., Insurance § 19-104 (LexisNexis 2011) (Maryland 
Insurance Code, Health Care Malpractice Insurance); 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 532 (2008) 
(discussing how tender of payment may be an admission of liability and discussing statutes 
prohibiting admission of advance payments as evidence of admission of liability).  
205.  See FEINBERG, supra note 26, at 131–32. 
206.  J. David Prince, Compensation for Victims of Hazardous Substance Exposure, 11 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 657, 700 (1985). 
207.  See Farber, supra note 101, at 1124 (“The desirability of compensation does not 
necessarily mean that a judicial forum is optimal.  A legislatively established administrative 
system might offer several advantages over courts.  It could operate under a more 
comprehensive set of rules.  Transaction costs could be lower because agency expertise would 
produce more efficient decisions.  It might also be easier for an agency to produce 
standardized protocols and payment schedules, which would also simplify the adjudicatory 
process.” (footnote omitted)). 
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private payments, concerns about manageability are minimized.   Courts 
are generally not involved.   
OPA accomplishes this by utilizing financial incentives that 
encourage responsible parties to promptly and privately pay 
documented interim damages.  OPA contains an interest penalty if a 
responsible party does not expeditiously pay claims.208  Specifically, the 
responsible party is liable for interest beginning on the thirtieth day 
following presentment up to the date on which the responsible party 
pays the claim.209  Prejudgment interest furthers the goal of complete 
compensation by awarding damages for the lost use of funds, including 
the opportunity to invest and earn interest from the time of the release 
to the time of judgment.210 OPA removes incentives for defendants to 
delay settlement by compounding damages that are not fully satisfied 
within ninety days.211  The statute permits parties who do not have their 
claims fully satisfied or settled within ninety days to elect to either 
litigate against the responsible party or to recover the amount of their 
unsatisfied claim from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF).212  If 
the OSLTF pays a claim, the OSLTF can then seek recoupment of that 
amount from the responsible party, along with interest, administrative 
costs, and attorney’s fees.213  Under this structure, delay causes further 
damages to accrue, the liability for which encourages responsible parties 
to provide prompt compensation.  Under OPA, recalcitrance does not 
pay. 
 
208.  33 U.S.C. § 2705(b)(1) (2012) (stating that OPA requires a responsible party to pay 
interest on claims “beginning on the 30th day following the date on which the claim is 
presented”).  Interest penalties are built into other damage schemes to facilitate prompt 
payment.  For example, state laws governing vehicular insurance coverage include interim 
payment structures encouraged by interest penalties.  See Micah J. Penn, 2006 Survey of 
Rhode Island Law Cases, Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Barry, 
892 A.2d 915 (R.I. 2006), 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 618, 620 (2007). 
209.  33 U.S.C. § 2705(b)(1). 
210.  Dean Richard, Note, “An Award Fit for Alice in Wonderland”—Texas Allows 
Prejudgment Interest on Future Damages: C&H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 37 Tex. Sup. 
Ct. J. 149 (Nov. 24, 1993), 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 955, 959, 980 (1994).   
211.  See 33 U.S.C. § 2713(c)(2) (“If a claim is presented in accordance with subsection 
(a) of this section and . . . the claim is not settled by any person by payment within 90 days 
. . . , the claimant may elect to commence an action in court against the responsible party or 
guarantor or to present the claim to the Fund.”). 
212.  Id. 
213.  Id. § 2715(c) (“[A]ction[s] on behalf of the Fund [will include] interest (including 
prejudgment interest), administrative and adjudicative costs, and attorney’s fees.”). 
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Without legislative encouragement, there is little incentive for a 
party to voluntarily pay interim damages.  It is economically 
advantageous to the responsible party to delay resolution of the damage 
award and often in a defendant’s best interest to zealously litigate 
outstanding questions of liability, damages, and contribution.  
V. CONCLUSION 
One of the fundamental roles of government is to facilitate the 
availability of compensation in the event of a disaster.214  As a 
component of this role, governments should create enforceable tort 
rights where necessary against those who cause man-made disasters to 
achieve justifiable compensation for victims.215  This is particularly true 
for hazardous substance releases, which have the potential to create 
mass harms, sometimes transforming the harm into a larger, arguably 
“quasi-public,” disaster.216 
Expanding private victim recovery to include pure economic loss 
and permitting recovery on an interim basis achieves more full and fair 
compensation, promotes environmental justice, encourages safe 
practices and behaviors, and avoids undue litigation-related stress.  
Without interim payments and pure economic damage recovery, there is 
a problematic compensation gap.  Many hazardous releases damage 
public resources like water and air.  Because many victims did not 
experience private physical or personal property harm, the pure 
economic loss rule effectively bars them from recompense.  Yet, those 
victims suffered economic loss.  In some instances, that loss can be 
catastrophic.   
Limited exceptions exist permitting recovery for commercial 
fisherman, family members, and victims of oil releases, but those 
exceptions are not sufficiently broad to cover the full gamut of victims 
who should recover.  Even when pure economic loss is recoverable as a 
consequence of physical or property injury, there is a problematic delay 
in compensating private victims that further compounds their harm.   
On the other hand, interim payments and pure economic damages 
raise concerns.  The most widely recited fear is of open-ended liability 
 
214.  See Sugarman, supra note 85, at 14. 
215.  See id.  
216.  See Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 128, at 401 (Man-made disasters have the 
potential to create mass harms which “take on the quality of public law litigation, even if 
played out in thousands of claims for public recompense.” (footnote omitted)). 
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that will cause insolvency and industry exodus, make insurance difficult 
or too pricey to obtain, or cause firms to overspend on deterrence 
measures that they pass onto consumers.217   
Because these damage mechanisms provide just, equitable, and fair 
compensation, and advance tort goals, concerns such as the fear of 
open-ended liability, while important to consider, need not defeat the 
endeavor.  As a policy matter, these concerns raise important issues that 
need to be addressed in the ultimate design of a system that facilitates 
interim payments and pure economic damage recovery.  Damage caps, 
in tandem with financial assurance requirements, for example, although 
imperfect vehicles to fully compensate all victims, provide a policy 
compromise that balances expanded compensation with limitations on 
the scope of liability.  Other devices, including proximate cause rules 
and limitations on the type and amount of releases to trigger recovery, 
serve to provide a measure of certainty about the scope of liability.  
Imposing interim damage liability only in strict liability situations where 
there is a readily identifiable responsible party mitigates due process 
concerns and lessons the judicial burden. 
“In tort law, ‘big’ is not necessarily ‘bad.’  The scale of litigation is 
not by itself a reason for courts to flinch.”218  When the goal is 
worthwhile, it is a question of how, not whether, to structure the system. 
 
217.  Perry, supra note 7, at 14–16. 
218.  Farber, supra note 101, at 1128. 
